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1. Introduction
Combinatorial optimization games, also known as OR-games (Curiel, 1997;
Borm et al., 2001) analyze cooperative situations where the worth of a coalition of
players is the optimal result of a well-known operations research problem. Among
others we mention linear production games (Owen, 1975), minimum cost spanning
tree games (Granot and Huberman, 1981), inventory games (Hartman and Dror,
1996; Hartman et al., 2000; Meca et al. 2004), minimum coloring games (Deng
et al. 2000; Bietenhader and Okamoto, 2006), supply chain management games
(Nagarajan and Sosˇic´, 2008).
Matching in graphs are combinatorial optimization problems. Because of its
importance they have been studied in depth (Lova´sz and Plummer, 1986; Korte
and Vygen, 2000). In a pioneering paper, Shapley and Shubik (1972) analyze the
bipartite graph case as a cooperative problem. It is called the assignment game.
The assignment game (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is the cooperative viewpoint of
a two-sided market. There are two sides of the market, i.e. two disjoint sets of
agents, buyers and sellers, who can trade. The profits are collected in the edges of
the graph as the weights, or can be represented in a matrix, the assignment matrix.
The problem is that the maximal weight matching or the gain of the market is to
be shared fairly among the agents. The allocation of the optimal profit should be
such that no coalition has incentives to depart from the grand coalition and act on
its own. In doing so, a first game-theoretical analysis of cooperation focuses on the
core of the game. Shapley and Shubik show that the core of any assignment game
is always non-empty. It coincides with the set of solutions of the linear program,
dual to the classical optimal assignment problem. Assignment games have been
widely studied in the literature (Quint, 1991; Granot and Granot, 1992; Martı´nez-
de-Albe´niz et al., 2011a, 2011b).
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Among other solutions, the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is a “fair” solution in
the general context of cooperative games. It is a unique core-selection that lexico-
graphically minimizes the excesses1 arranged in a nondecreasing way. The stan-
dard procedure for computing the nucleolus proceeds by solving a finite (but large)
number of related linear programs. As a solution concept, the nucleolus has been
analyzed and computed in many OR-games, for instance Okamoto (2008), Soly-
mosi et al. (2005), Kern and Paulusma (2003), Faigle et al. (1998), Granot et
al. (1996), Deng and Papadimitriou (1994), or Granot and Huberman (1981). An
interesting survey on the nucleolus and its computational complexity is given in
Greco et al. (2015).
For matching games, the general non-bipartite case, the complexity of the com-
putation of the nucleolus is still an open problem. Some special cases have been
studied, for instance, balanced matching games (Biro´ et al., 2011) or cardinality
matching games, with unitary weights (Kern and Paulusma, 2003). In all these
cases it is proved the nucleolus can be computed in polynomial time, what can be
viewed as a generalization of the first result with an algorithm for the computation
of the nucleolus of the assignment game, the bilateral case (Solymosi and Ragha-
van, 1994). Recently Martı´nez-de-Albe´niz et al. (2013) provides a new procedure
to compute the nucleolus of the assignment game. From a geometric point of view,
Llerena and Nu´n˜ez (2011) have characterized the nucleolus of a square assignment
game, essential for our purposes. Llerena et al. (2015) gives an axiomatic approach
of the nucleolus of the assignment game.
In this paper we focus on the structure of matrices, that is the weight system on
bipartite graphs, that give rise to the same nucleolus.
1Given a coalition S⊆N, and an allocation x∈RN the excess of a coalition is defined as e(S,x) :=
v(S)−∑i∈S xi. Note they can be considered as complaints.
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To illustrate the problem, consider the assignment matrix
A =
 8 6
4 4
 .
The worth to share is v∗= 12, and its nucleolus is (5,2,3,2)∈R2+×R2+, but matrix
B =
 8 4
0 4

has also the same nucleolus. Now we draw the core of the associated assignment
games and their nucleolus. We depict the projection on the buyers’ (first) coor-
dinates of the core of both games in Figure 1. The core of the first one C(wA)
is in dark shading and the second one C(wB) in light shading. From Llerena and
Nu´n˜ez (2011) the nucleolus of matrix A is the unique core point such that the dis-
tances over some segments to the core’s walls are equal: A′N = NB′,C′N = ND′
and EN = NF . For matrix B we have AN = NB,CN = ND and EN = NF .
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Figure 1: Two cores with the same nucleolus, (5,2;3,2).
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From the above geometric illustration we may expect a large class of assign-
ment matrices sharing a given vector as their nucleolus.
The main contributions of the paper are the following:
• The family of matrices with the same nucleolus forms a join-semilattice, i.e.
closed by entry-wise maximum. The family has a unique maximum element
which is always a valuation matrix and we give its explicit form (Section 3).
• We show that the above family is a path-connected set, and give the precise
path. We construct some minimal elements of the family (Section 4).
• We give conditions to characterize the non-emptiness of the family, i.e. con-
ditions on a vector to be the nucleolus of some assignment game (Section
3).
2. Preliminaries and notation
An assignment market (M,M′,A) is defined to be two disjoint finite sets: M the
set of buyers and M′ the set of sellers, and a nonnegative matrix A = (ai j)i∈M, j∈M′
which represents the profit obtained by each mixed-pair (i, j) ∈M×M′. To distin-
guish the j-th seller from the j-th buyer we will write the former as j′ when needed.
The assignment market is called square whenever |M| = |M′| . Usually we denote
by m= |M| and m′ = |M′| . M+m denotes the set of nonnegative square matrices with
m rows and columns, and M+m×m′ the set of nonnegative matrices with m rows and
m′ columns.
Recall that M+m×m′ forms a lattice with the usual ordering ≤ between matrices.
Given an ordered subset of matrices (F ,≤) ,F ⊆M+m×m′ , we say matrix C ∈F
is a minimal element of (F ,≤) if there is no matrix D ∈ F , with D 6= C and
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D≤C. A matrix A ∈M+m×m′ is a valuation matrix2 if for any i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m′} we have ai1 j1 +ai2 j2 = ai1 j2 +ai2 j1 .
A matching µ ⊆M×M′ between M and M′ is a bijection from M0⊆M to M′0⊆
M′ with |M0|= |M′0|= min{|M| , |M′|} . We write (i, j) ∈ µ as well as j = µ (i) or
i = µ−1 ( j). If for some buyer i ∈M there is no seller j ∈M′ satisfying (i, j) ∈ µ
we say buyer i is unmatched by µ and similarly for sellers. The set of all matchings
from M to M′ is represented byM (M,M′) . A matching µ ∈M (M,M′) is optimal
for (M,M′,A) if ∑(i, j)∈µ ai j ≥ ∑(i, j)∈µ ′ ai j for any µ ′ ∈M (M,M′) . We denote by
M ∗A (M,M
′) the set of all optimal matchings.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) associate any assignment market with a game in
coalitional form (M∪M′,wA) called the assignment game in which the worth of a
coalition formed by S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M′ is wA (S∪T ) = max
µ∈M (S,T )
∑(i, j)∈µ ai j, and
any coalition formed only by buyers or sellers has a worth of zero.
The main goal is to allocate the total worth among the agents, and one of the
prominent solutions for cooperative games is the core. Shapley and Shubik (1972)
prove that the core of the assignment game is always nonempty. Given an optimal
matching µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) , the core of the assignment game, C(wA), can be easily
described as the set of non-negative payoff vectors (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ satisfying
xi+ y j = ai j for all (i, j) ∈ µ, (1)
xi+ y j ≥ ai j for all (i, j) ∈M×M′, (2)
and all agents unmatched by µ get a null payoff.
Now we define the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) of an assignment game, tak-
ing into account that its core is always nonempty. The excess of a coalition /0 6=
R ⊆ M ∪M′ with respect to an allocation in the core, (x,y) ∈ C(wA), is defined
2Following Topkis (1998), a function is a valuation if it is submodular and supermodular.
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as e(R,(x,y)) := wA (R)−∑i∈R∩M xi−∑ j∈R∩M′ y j. By the bilateral nature of the
market, it is known that the only coalitions that matter are the individual and
mixed-pair ones. Given an allocation (x,y) ∈ C(wA), define the excess vector
θ (x,y) = (θk)k=1,...,r as the vector of individual and mixed-pair coalitions excesses
arranged in a non-increasing order, i.e. θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ . . . ≥ θr. Then the nucleolus of
the game (M∪M′,wA) is the unique core allocation ν (wA) ∈C(wA) which mini-
mizes θ (x,y) with respect to the lexicographic order3 over the whole set of core
allocations. For ease of notation we will use, for A ∈ M+m×m′ , ν (A) instead of
ν (wA) if no confusion arises.
Solymosi and Raghavan (1994) use the excess vector to describe an algorithm
to compute the nucleolus and Martı´nez-de-Albe´niz et al. (2013) give a new pro-
cedure to compute it for any assignment game. Here, we use the characterization
of the nucleolus of a square assignment game of Llerena and Nu´n˜ez (2011), see
also Llerena et al. (2015), to study some properties of the nucleolus. To this end
we define the maximum transfer from a coalition to another coalition. Given any
square assignment game (M∪M′,wA) , and two arbitrary coalitions of the same
cardinality /0 6= S⊆M and /0 6= T ⊆M′, with |S|= |T | we define
δAS,T (x,y) := min
i∈S, j∈M′\T
{
xi,xi+ y j−ai j
}
, (3)
δAT,S (x,y) := min
j∈T,i∈M\S
{
y j,xi+ y j−ai j
}
, (4)
for any core allocation (x,y) ∈C (wA).
The interpretation of expression (3) is the following: the largest same amount
that can be transferred from players in S to players in T with respect to the core
3The lexicographic order ≥lex on Rd is defined in the following way: x≥lex y, where x,y ∈ Rd ,
if x = y or if there exists 1≤ t ≤ d such that xk = yk for all 1≤ k < t and xt > yt .
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allocation (x,y) while remaining in the core, that is,
δAS,T (x,y) = max
{
ε ≥ 0 | (x− ε1S,y+ ε1T ) ∈C (wA)} , (5)
where 1S and 1T represent the characteristic vectors4 associated with coalition S⊆
M and T ⊆M′, respectively.
Llerena and Nu´n˜ez (2011) prove that the nucleolus of a square assignment
game is characterized as the unique core allocation (x,y) ∈C(wA) where
δAS,T (x,y) = δ
A
T,S (x,y) (6)
for any /0 6= S ⊆M and /0 6= T ⊆M′ with |S|= |T |. In certain cases, the number of
equalities can be reduced. Indeed, note that if T 6= µ(S) for some µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) ,
then it holds δAS,T (x,y) = δAT,S (x,y) = 0. Therefore, for this characterization we
only have to check (6) for the cases T = µ(S) for some optimal matching µ ∈
M ∗A (M,M
′) and any /0 6= S⊆M, i.e.
δAS,µ(S) (x,y) = δ
A
µ(S),S (x,y) , for any /0 6= S⊆M. (7)
3. Assignment games with the same nucleolus
Different assignment games may have the same nucleolus. As a simple illus-
trative example, matrices A,B ∈M+2
A =
 2 0
0 2
 , and B =
 0 2
2 0
 . (8)
satisfy ν (A) = ν (B) = (1,1,1,1).
Notice also that matrices with the same nucleolus must have the same worth
for the grand coalition even if they do not have any optimal matching in common.
4Given S⊆ {1, . . . ,n} ,1S ∈ Rn is such that 1Si = 1, if i ∈ S, and zero otherwise.
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We focus now on an interesting property of the family of assignment matrices that
share the same nucleolus: they form a join-semilattice. That is, given two matrices
with the same nucleolus, their maximum, defined entry-wise, has also the same
nucleolus5.
Theorem 3.1. Let A,A′ ∈ M+m×m′ be two matrices sharing the same nucleolus,
ν (A) = ν (A′) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ . Then, A∨A′ has the same nucleolus, i.e. ν (A∨A′) =
ν (A) = ν (A′) .
Proof. If m 6= m′, we add zero rows or columns to make the matrices square. It
is known that these rows or columns correspond to dummy players which obtain
zero payoff at any core allocation, and also in the nucleolus. Therefore we can
assume from now on that matrices are square. We have A,A′ ≤ A∨A′, and also
C(wA)∩C(wA′) 6= /0, since both games share the nucleolus. We claim
C(wA)∩C(wA′) =C(wA∨A′).
To see it, take any (x,y) ∈C(wA)∩C(wA′). It is clear xi+y j ≥max{ai j,a′i j} for all
(i, j) ∈M×M′. Then for any optimal matching µ of A∨A′ we have
wA∨A′(M∪M′) = ∑
(i, j)∈µ
max{ai j,a′i j} ≤
∑
(i, j)∈µ
[xi+ y j] =wA(M∪M′) = wA′(M∪M′).
As a consequence wA∨A′(M∪M′) = wA(M∪M′) = wA′(M∪M′). Now it is easy to
see (x,y) ∈C(wA∨A′). The other inclusion is straightforward.
5This property also holds with respect to the core (Martı´nez-de-Albe´niz et al., 2011a), but curi-
ously it is worth noting this property does not hold for the kernel, a set-solution defined by Davis
and Maschler (1965). This can be easily seen by using the above matrices. Note that the nucleolus
always belongs to the kernel, and Driessen (1998) proves that for assignment games, the kernel is
included in the core.
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Now to see ν (A) = ν (A′) = (x,y) is the nucleolus of wA∨A′ , just note that, for
all /0 6= S⊆M and /0 6= T ⊆M′ with |S|= |T |,
δA∨A
′
S,T (x,y) = min
{
δAS,T (x,y) ,δ
A′
S,T (x,y)
}
, and
δA∨A
′
T,S (x,y) = min
{
δAT,S (x,y) ,δ
A′
T,S (x,y)
}
.
As a consequence, since (x,y) is the nucleolus of wA and wA′ , we obtain the equality
δA∨A′S,T (x,y) = δA∨A
′
T,S (x,y) .
The previous result shows that the set of matrices with the same nucleolus is a
join-semilattice. Now we introduce the family of matrices with a given nucleolus
(x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ ,
Fν (x,y) :=
{
A ∈M+m×m′ | ν (A) = (x,y)
}
.
In this section we prove that the above family of assignment matrices forms a
compact join-semilattice with a unique maximal element which is always a valua-
tion (Topkis, 1998).
Firstly notice that not any vector is a candidate to be a nucleolus. For instance,
the vector (3,2,1,4)∈R2+×R2+ can never be the nucleolus of any 2×2 assignment
game. For any candidate (x,y) ∈RM+ ×RM
′
+ with |M|= |M′|, to be the nucleolus of
an assignment game with matrix A ∈M+m , by (6) it must satisfy
δAM,M′ (x,y) = mini∈M {xi}= minj∈M′
{
y j
}
= δAM′,M (x,y) . (9)
In our case min{x1,x2}= 2 6= 1 = min{y1,y2} .
Moreover, let us see that condition (9) turns out to be a simple characterization
of the non-emptiness of the familyFν (x,y) if we deal with the square assignment
case |M|= |M′|. To see it, just define the square matrix V = (vi j)1≤i, j≤m defined by
vi j := xi + y j, for all (i, j) ∈M×M′ being (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ with |M|= |M′| and
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min
i∈M
{xi}= min
j∈M′
{
y j
}
. Indeed, any matching is optimal in V and the vector (x,y) ∈
C(wV ). Therefore δVS,T (x,y) = δ
V
T,S (x,y) = 0 for all /0 6= S⊆M and /0 6= T ⊆M′ with
|S| = |T |, and S 6= M. Moreover δVM,M′ (x,y) = δVM′,M (x,y) by assumption. Hence
we have ν (V ) = (x,y). Summarizing we have the following result.
Theorem 3.2 (Condition for the nucleolus in the square case). Let (x,y)∈RM+×
RM′+ be a vector, with |M|= |M′|. The following statements are equivalent:
1. Fν (x,y) 6= /0,
2. min
i∈M
{xi}= min
j∈M′
{
y j
}
.
To analyze the non-square case we need an important result relating the nu-
cleolus of a non-square assignment game with the nucleolus of a suitable square
assignment game, which will be used later. Its proof is in the Appendix. This is a
result of independent interest to deal with non-square assignment games, since the
usual approach is to add null rows or columns in order to make the matrix square.
Firstly we need some definitions.
Let A ∈M+m×m′ be a non-square assignment matrix, with m = |M|< |M′|= m′,
and let µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) be an optimal matching. Define the vector aµ =
(
aµi
)
i∈M ∈
RM+ by
aµi := max
j∈M′\µ(M)
{
ai j
}
for each buyer i ∈M, (10)
and define the square matrix Aµ ∈M+m by
aµi j := max
{
0,ai j−aµi
}
, for (i, j) ∈M×µ (M) . (11)
Lemma 3.1. Let A ∈M+m×m′ be a non-square assignment matrix, with |M|< |M′|,
and let µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) be an optimal matching. Let aµ ∈RM+ and Aµ ∈M+m be as
in (10) and (11), and let (x,y) ∈RM+ ×RM
′
+ and (x
′,y′) ∈RM+ ×Rµ(M)+ be related by
x′i = xi−aµi , for i ∈M,
y′j = y j, for j ∈ µ(M), and y j = 0 for j ∈M′\µ (M) .
12
Then (x,y) ∈C (wA) if and only if (x′,y′) ∈C (wAµ ) .
Moreover, ν (A) = (x,y) if and only if ν (Aµ) = (x′,y′).
Since it is well known that the nucleolus of a non-square assignment game
gives zero payoff to all non-optimally assigned players, then a candidate vector
must assign zero to some players. The next result is the precise necessary and
sufficient condition. Its proof is in the Appendix
Theorem 3.3 (Condition for the nucleolus in the non-square case). Let (x,y) ∈
RM+ ×RM
′
+ be a vector, with |M| < |M′|, and let Z0 =
{
j ∈M′ | y j = 0
}
. The fol-
lowing statements are equivalent:
1. Fν (x,y) 6= /0,
2. (a) there exists Z′0 ⊆ Z0 with |Z′0|= |M′|− |M|, and
(b) min
i∈M
{xi} ≥ min
j∈M′\Z′0
{
y j
}
.
Notice that from Theorem 3.2 and 3.3, the vector (3,2,1,4) ∈ R2+×R2+ can
never be the nucleolus of any 2×2 assignment game, but the vector (3,2,1,4,0) ∈
R2+×R3+ is the nucleolus of some assignment game, see (12).
Now we turn to the structure of the matrices that share the same nucleolus, and
describe its maximum element.
Theorem 3.4. The family of matrices with a given nucleolus Fν(x,y) forms a
compact set, where (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ , |M| ≤ |M′| . Moreover, if it is nonempty, it
has a unique maximum element, which is described by the valuation matrix V ∈
Fν(x,y) given by
vi j =

xi+ y j if i ∈M, and j ∈M′ \Z′0,
xi− min
j∈M′\Z′0
{
y j
}
if i ∈M, and j ∈ Z′0,
(12)
where Z′0 is any subset of Z0 =
{
j ∈M′ | y j = 0
}
with cardinality |Z′0|= |M′|−|M| .
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Proof. Let (x,y) ∈RM+×RM
′
+ be a vector withFν(x,y) 6= /0. For each A ∈Fν(x,y)
consider the square matrix A˜ which has (m′−m) zero rows, i.e. dummy buyers,
to make matrix A square. If m′ = m, A˜ = A. Let us denote by M˜ the new set of
buyers associated to the assignment market A˜. This new assignment matrix A˜ has an
extended nucleolus with zero payoffs to the added agents, namely ν(A˜) = (x,0;y) .
Now, let us see Fν(x,y) is a compact set, i.e. a bounded and closed subset of
M+m×m′ . It is bounded since 0≤ ai j ≤ xi+y j for all (i, j)∈M×M′ and A∈Fν(x,y).
It is closed because the functions δ A˜S,T (x,0;y) and δ A˜T,S (x,0;y) are continuous in A˜
for all /0 6= S⊆ M˜, /0 6= T ⊆M′ and |S|= |T | , and they must satisfy (6).
Next we show that the given matrix V is the maximum element inFν(x,y), i.e.
A≤V for all A ∈Fν(x,y). It should first be noted that V is well-defined because if
there exists different Z′0 they give the same matrix V. Furthermore, from the proof
of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, we have already shown that the nucleolus of matrix V is
the vector (x,y) as well as V is a valuation matrix.
Let A ∈Fν(x,y) be a matrix, µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) be an optimal matching, and
Z′0 = M
′\µ(M). Then Z′0 ⊆ Z0, |Z′0| = |M′| − |M| and let V be the matrix defined
in the statement. We have to prove vi j ≥ ai j for all (i, j) ∈M×M′. Clearly, since
(x,y) ∈ C (wA) , for i ∈ M and j ∈ M′\Z′0, we have vi j = xi + y j ≥ ai j. Now re-
call (10) and Lemma 3.1 and since µ is an optimal matching such that µ(M) =
M′\Z′0, we have (x′,y′) = ν(Aµ). Denote ε = δA
µ
M,M′\Z′0 (x
′,y′) = δAµM′\Z′0,M (x
′,y′) =
min
j∈M′\Z′0
{
y j
}
. Since (x′,y′)= ν(Aµ) and taking into account (5), we have
(
x′− ε1M,y′+ ε1M′\Z′0
)
∈
C (wAµ ) . Then for all i ∈M we have x′i−ε ≥ 0, that is, xi−ε ≥ aµi . From here, for
all i ∈M and j ∈ Z′0, we have vi j = xi− minj∈M′\Z′0
{
y j
} ≥ aµi ≥ ai j. This finishes the
proof.
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4. Properties of the join-semilattice
It is interesting to point out that the familyFν(x,y) is not in general a convex
set. Just take the matrices in (8) and their midpoint.
Now we prove an interesting property. There is a continuous piecewise linear
path (maybe not unique) between any matrix inFν(x,y) and its maximum element
V. From here it is clear that the familyFν(x,y) is a path-connected set.
Theorem 4.1. LetFν(x,y) be a nonempty family of matrices with a given nucleo-
lus, where (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ , |M| ≤ |M′| , and V ∈Fν(x,y) be its maximum given
in (12). Then for any A∈Fν(x,y) there exists an increasing piecewise linear path6
from A to V insideFν(x,y).
As a consequence,Fν(x,y) is a path-connected set.
Proof. First we analyze the square case. We can assume |M| ≥ 2. Let it be A ∈
Fν(x,y). Let us define the following set, formed by the distances that appear in the
characterization of the nucleolus, see (6), except for the grand coalition,
∆(A) =
{
δAS,T (x,y) |S⊆M,T ⊆M′, |S|= |T |,S 6= /0,M, and T 6= /0,M′
}
.
The elements of ∆(A) = {δ0,δ1, . . . ,δr} can be ordered increasingly: 0= δ0 < δ1 <
.. . < δr.
Note that for all (i, j) ∈M×M′ satisfying xi+y j−ai j /∈ ∆(A) we can raise the
worth of ai j to a0i j in a way that xi+ y j−a0i j equals to the closest element in ∆(A),
and set a0i j = ai j otherwise. The nucleolus of this new matrix A
0 is also (x,y). We
may choose different increasing linear paths from A to A0.
6A path inX ⊆M+m×m′ from A to B, A,B ∈X , is a continuous function f from the unit interval
I = [0,1] toX , i.e. f : [0,1]→X , with f (0) = A and f (1) = B. Moreover a subsetX ⊆M+m×m′ is
path-connected if for any two elements A,B ∈X there exists a path from A to B entirely contained
inX .
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Now we have a matrix A0 ∈ Fν(x,y) such that xi + y j − a0i j ∈ ∆(A0) for all
(i, j) ∈ M×M′. Note that ∆(A0) = ∆(A) and if δAS,T (x,y) = δr, we have, for all
i ∈ S and j /∈ T, xi+ y j−a0i j = δr.
If r = 0, A0 =V and we are done. Otherwise, for all (i, j) ∈M×M′ such that
xi+y j−a0i j = δr raise linearly a0i j to a1i j defined by the equality xi+y j−a1i j = δr−1.
We obtain a new matrix A1 ∈Fν(x,y), defined for all i ∈M and j ∈M′ by
a1i j =
 xi+ y j−δr−1 if xi+ y j−a0i j = δr,a0i j otherwise.
We have ∆(A1)( ∆(A0).
Now, in a finite number of steps, proceed sequentially raising all entries until
for all (i, j) ∈ M×M′ we have xi + y j− ari j = 0. This is matrix V for the square
case.
For the non-square case, |M|< |M′| , let A ∈Fν(x,y), and let µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′)
be an optimal matching. Notice first that matrix A can be modified without chang-
ing its nucleolus in the following way: for all (i, j) ∈ M× µ(M) if ai j < aµi then
raise these entries to aµi , see (10); for all (i, j) ∈M× (M′ \µ(M)) raise entries ai j
to aµi , and we do not modify the rest of entries. This new matrix A ∈ Fν(x,y)
and gives rise to the same square matrix Aµ ∈ M+m , i.e. Aµ = Aµ , see (11). The
relationship between A and Aµ is
aµi j = ai j−aµi for all (i, j) ∈M×µ(M). (13)
From Lemma 3.1 applied to matrix A we know ν
(
A
)
= ν (A) = (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×
RM′+ if and only if ν
(
Aµ
)
= (x′,y′) ∈RM+ ×Rµ(M)+ , with x′i = xi−aµi for i ∈M, and
y′j = y j for j ∈ µ(M).
We can apply the previous procedure for square matrices to obtain an increas-
ing piecewise linear path from Aµ to its maximum matrix inFν(x′,y′). This path,
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applied to matrix A|M×µ(M) , see (13), induces a path from A|M×µ(M) to V|M×µ(M) , where
V is the maximum ofFν(x,y).
Moreover, for (i, j)∈M×(M′\µ(M)) recall from (12) that vi j = xi− min
j∈µ(M)
{
y j
}
.
From Theorem 3.2 we know that min
i∈M
{x′i} = min
j∈µ(M)
{y′j} = min
j∈µ(M)
{
y j
}
, and then
for some i∗ ∈M we have x′i∗ = xi∗−aµi∗ = minj∈µ(M)
{
y j
}
. That is, for i∗ ∈M we have
vi∗ j = a
µ
i∗ for all j∈M′\µ(M). For any i 6= i∗ such that x′i >mini∈M {x
′
i} or equivalently
x′i = xi−aµi > mini∈M {x
′
i}= min
j∈µ(M)
{
y j
}
, that is aµi < xi− minj∈µ(M)
{
y j
}
, we can raise
at the same time entries ai j = a
µ
i to vi j = xi− minj∈µ(M)
{
y j
}
without changing the
nucleolus, as the reader can check applying Lemma 3.1. This ends the proof.
Finally, with respect to the minimal elements of the semilattice (Fν(x,y),≤)
our next result reveals the existence of many of them. Basically we obtain a min-
imal matrix each time we fix an appropriate optimal matching. Notice that any
minimal matrix in the family has at least one optimal matching in common with
matrix V, the maximum element of the family. Therefore, it is natural to ask for a
minimal matrix whenever an optimal matching for matrix V has been fixed.
Curiously enough, not any optimal matching can be used. For instance, take the
nucleolus (x,y)= (0,3,2,0)∈R2+×R2+. Note thatFν(x,y) 6= /0. and min{x1,x2}=
0 = min{y1,y2}. The valuation matrix
V =
 2 0
5 3

has two optimal matchings. The first one, µ1 = {(1,1) ,(2,2)} cannot be preserved
if we look for minimality, but the second one µ2 = {(1,2) ,(2,1)} can. Indeed,
C =
 0 0
5 1

is the desired minimal matrix. Differences between both matchings are subtle and
they will be specified in the next definition.
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To go on, let (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ with |M| ≤ |M′| such that Fν(x,y) 6= /0, and
let V ∈ Fν(x,y) be its maximum given in (12). We say that an optimal match-
ing µ ∈M ∗V (M,M′) is a minimal-matrix compatible matching (m2-compatible) if
min
j∈µ(M)
{
y j
}
= 0 then there exists a buyer i∗ ∈ M such that xi∗ = min
i∈M
{xi} and his
optimal partner receives yµ(i∗) = min
j∈µ(M)
{
y j
}
= 0. The set of all m2-compatible
matchings is denoted byMm (V ) .
Notice that in the square case, if min
i∈M
{xi} = min
j∈M′
{
y j
}
> 0, all matchings are
m2-compatible. As a consequence, m! minimal matrices may appear. A similar
result holds for the non-square case, as the next theorem implies.
Theorem 4.2 (Computation of a minimal matrix). Let Fν(x,y) be a nonempty
family of matrices with a given nucleolus, where (x,y)∈RM+×RM
′
+ and |M| ≤ |M′| .
Let V ∈Fν(x,y) be the maximum of the family.
For any minimal-matrix compatible matching µ ∈Mm (V ) there exists matrix
C ∈Fν(x,y) with µ ∈M ∗C (M,M′) and C is minimal in (Fν(x,y),≤) . Moreover,
if |M| ≥ 3 then C 6=V whenever (x,y) is not the null vector.
Proof. For ease of the proof and w.l.o.g. we adopt the following normalization
conditions, maybe by reordering agents:
i. We assume x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ·· · ≤ xm.
ii. The original matching µ is in the main diagonal µ = {(1,1) , . . . ,(m,m)} .
Moreover, once i. and ii. have been achieved we also ask for an additional condi-
tion:
iii. If there exists i∗ ∈M such that xi∗ =min{x1, . . . ,xm} and yi∗ =min{y1, . . . ,ym},
then x1 = min{x1, . . . ,xm} and y1 = min{y1, . . . ,ym}.
Condition iii. has the following interpretation. If two optimally matched partners
receive minimum payoff among the matched agents of their side, it happens also
in the first place.
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Now we analyze the square case, |M|= |M′| . We define matrix C ∈M+m by
cii = xi+ yi for i = 1, . . . ,m,
ci1 = xi+ y1− yi for i = 2, . . . ,m, and xi > yi,
c1 j = x1+ y j− x j for j = 2, . . . ,m, and x j < y j,
ci j = 0 otherwise.
Clearly the main diagonal is an optimal matching for C. Moreover the vector
(x,y) ∈C (wC) .
Now we prove ν (C) = (x,y) . For simplicity we write S′ instead of µ(S) for
S⊆M. Therefore, we prove δCS,S′ (x,y) = δCS′,S (x,y) for all /0 6= S⊆M, see (7).
Notice first that for i 6= j we have
xi+ y j− ci j =

yi if j = 1 and xi > yi,
x j if i = 1 and x j < y j,
xi+ y j otherwise.
Let /0 6= S⊆M be an arbitrary coalition. We distinguish two cases.
Case (a): Buyer i = 1 does not belong to the coalition S, i.e. 1 /∈ S. Then,
δCS,S′ (x,y) = min
{
min
i∈S
{xi} , min
i∈S j/∈S′
{
xi+ y j− ci j
}}
= min
{
min
i∈S
{xi} , min
i∈S, xi>yi
{yi}
}
= min
{
min
i∈S
{xi} ,min
j∈S′
{
y j
}}
.
Similarly,
δCS′,S (x,y) = min
{
min
j∈S′
{
y j
}
,min
i∈S
{xi}
}
.
Case (b): Buyer i = 1 belongs to the coalition S, i.e. 1 ∈ S. Then,
δCS,S′ (x,y) = min
{
min
i∈S
{xi} , min
i∈S j/∈S′
{
xi+ y j− ci j
}}
= min
{
min
i∈S
{xi} , min
j/∈S′,x j<y j
{
x j
}}
= x1.
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Moreover, we have
δCS′,S (x,y) = min
{
min
j∈S′
{
y j
}
, min
i/∈S j∈S′
{
xi+ y j− ci j
}}
= min
{
min
j∈S′
{
y j
}
, min
i/∈S,yi<xi
{yi}
}
= min
j∈M′
{
y j
}
= x1.
To see the last but one equality, let j∗ ∈M′ be such that y j∗ =min j∈M′{y j}. Clearly
y j∗ = min j∈M′{y j} = min
i∈M
{xi} ≤ x j∗ . Then the only case we have to analyze is
y j∗ = x j∗ = x1. In this case, the normalization conditions imply y1 = y j∗ = x j∗ , and
the equality holds, since 1′ ∈ S′.
As a consequence, ν (C) = (x,y) .
It remains to prove matrix C is minimal in (Fν(x,y),≤) . Suppose on the con-
trary that there exists matrix D ∈M+m ,D≤C,D 6=C and ν (D) = (x,y) .
First we claim that for any optimal matching µ ′ ∈M ∗C (M,M′) , if xi > 0 and
yi > 0 then (i, i) ∈ µ ′. Indeed and since ν (C) = (x,y) ∈ C(wC), we know xk +
yµ ′(k) = ckµ ′(k) for any buyer k ∈ M and µ ′ an optimal matching of C. Now if
µ ′(i) 6= i′ and since xi > 0 we know that either i = 1 or µ ′(i) = 1′. If i = 1, by the
normalization conditions, we know xk > 0 for all k ∈ M and since c1µ ′(1) 6= 0 we
obtain c1µ ′(1) = x1+yµ ′(1)−xµ ′(1) and then xµ ′(1) = 0, a contradiction. If µ ′(i) = 1′
and since ci1 6= 0 we obtain ci1 = xi + y1 − yi and then yi = 0, a contradiction.
Therefore the claim holds.
Note now that all optimal matchings in D are optimal also in C, since D ≤ C
and they have the same nucleolus. We distinguish two possibilities and recall µ =
{(1,1) , . . . ,(m,m)} ∈M ∗C (M,M′) .
(a) µ ∈M ∗D (M,M′) , i.e. dii = cii for i = 1, . . . ,m. Since D 6= C there must
exist 0 ≤ di1 < ci1 or 0 ≤ d1 j < c1 j with i ≥ 2 or j ≥ 2. We analyze the
first case, and the other is left to the reader. From 0 ≤ di1 < ci1, we achieve
ci1 6= 0, i ≥ 2 and then xi > yi. Moreover by the definition of C, we have
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c1i = 0, which implies d1i = 0. Now
δD{i},{i′}(x,y) =min
{
xi,min
k 6=i
{xi+ yk−dik}
}
= min{xi,xi+ y1−di1}, and
δD{i′},{i}(x,y) =min
{
yi,min
k 6=i
{xk + yi−dki}
}
= yi,
but then we get xi+ y1−di1 = yi, which implies ci1 = di1, a contradiction.
(b) µ /∈M ∗D (M,M′) . Therefore there exists another matching µ ′ which is op-
timal, µ ′ ∈M ∗D (M,M′) , and then µ ′ ∈M ∗C (M,M′) . There exists i ∈ M,
µ ′(i) 6= µ(i) = i′ with 0 ≤ dii < cii, that is dii = cii− ε with ε > 0, and by
the claim, either xi > 0 and yi = 0 or xi = 0 and yi > 0. Notice that since µ is
an m2-compatible matching and the normalization conditions we have i≥ 2
and x1 = y1 = 0. We analyze the first case xi > 0 and yi = 0 and the second
case is similar. Now we claim µ ′(i) = 1′. If µ ′(i) 6= 1′ and being µ ′(i) 6= i′
and i≥ 2 we have ciµ ′(i) = 0, and then 0 = ciµ ′(i) < xi+ yµ ′(i), contradicting
the optimality of µ ′, since ν(C) = (x,y).
Now we prove δD{i},{µ ′(i)}(x,y) 6= δD{µ ′(i)},{i}(x,y), for µ ′ ∈M ∗D (M,M′) . Re-
call that µ ′(i) = 1′,d11 = c11 = x1+ y1 = 0 and dik = 0 for k 6= 1, i. Hence
δD{i},{1′}(x,y) =min
{
xi,min
k 6=1
{xi+ yk−dik}
}
= min{xi,ε}, and
δD{1′},{i}(x,y) =min
{
y1,min
k 6=i
{xk + y1−dk1}
}
= y1 = 0,
and they are different, a contradiction with ν (D) = (x,y) .
Therefore matrix C is minimal.
Now we analyze the non-square case, |M|< |M′| . From the normalization con-
ditions x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ·· · ≤ xm, and µ = {(1,1) , . . . ,(m,m)} .
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We define matrix C ∈M+m×m′ by
cii = xi+ yi for i = 1, . . . ,m,
ci1 = xi+ y1− yi for i = 2, . . . ,m, and xi > yi,
c1 j = x1+ y j− x j for j = 2, . . . ,m, and x j < y j,
c1m+1 = x1− min
j∈µ(M)
{y j}
ci j = 0 otherwise.
The proof that this is the desired matrix in the non-square case is similar to the
square case and can be found in the Appendix.
It is clear from the definition of matrix C that if (x,y) 6= (0,0) ∈RM+ ×RM
′
+ and
|M| ≥ 3 then C 6=V.
As a direct consequence of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 we obtain an interesting result
on the cardinality of the familyFν(x,y).
Corollary 4.1. For any vector (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ either
(a) Fν(x,y) = /0,
(b) Fν(x,y) is a singleton, or
(c) Fν(x,y) has a continuum of elements.
We have characterized when the familyFν(x,y) is non-empty, and from Theo-
rem 4.2 we know that for matrices with at least three agents in each side, the family
has an infinite number of elements, since a minimal matrix does not coincide with
the valuation matrix of the family and by the path-connectedness we can construct
an infinite number of matrices between them. If we want to look when the fam-
ily is a singleton, and apart the trivial cases of a sector having only one agent or
the original vector being the null vector, we must seek a 2× 2 case. It is easy to
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see that for the square case 2× 2 the only non-trivial case is given by the vector
(0,0,0,k)∈R2+×R2+ for k > 0 and its permutations. The proof is left to the reader,
but in this case for k > 0
Fν(0,0,0,k) =

 0 k
0 k
 .
5. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Let A∈M+m×m′ and let µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) . Without loss of generality, we can
assume that µ = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m,m)} is an optimal matching of matrix A.
We claim that µ is an optimal matching of Aµ , defined by (10) and (11). To see
it, consider any (x,y) ∈C(wA). Clearly xi ≥ aµi for all i ∈M, and then xi−aµi ≥ 0,
and (xi− aµi )+ y j ≥ 0, for all (i, j) ∈ M× µ(M). Moreover, for all (i, j) ∈ M×
µ(M), we have (xi−aµi )+ y j ≥ ai j−aµi , and therefore (xi−aµi )+ y j ≥ aµi j. Since
µ = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m,m)} is an optimal matching for A, then aii ≥ aµi for all
i ∈M, and we obtain (xi− aµi )+ yi = aii− aµi = aµii , for all i ∈M. From this it is
easy to see our claim: for any µ ′ ∈M (M,µ(M)) ,
∑
(i, j)∈µ
aµi j =
m
∑
i=1
aµii =
m
∑
i=1
(xi−aµi )+ yi = ∑
(i, j)∈µ ′
(xi−aµi )+ y j ≥ ∑
(i, j)∈µ ′
aµi j.
Define the following square matrix A0 ∈M+m′ obtained from the original matrix
A by adding m′−m zero rows, that is m′−m dummy players, and let M0 = M∪
{m+1, . . . ,m′} be the new set of buyers and A0 =
(
a0i j
)
1≤i, j≤m′
where
a0i j =
 ai j if (i, j) ∈M×M′,0 if (i, j) ∈ (M0\M)×M′.
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We know that the matching µ0 = µ ∪{(m+1,m+1) , . . . ,(m′,m′)} is optimal
for matrix A0, i.e. µ0 ∈M ∗A0
(
M0,M′
)
.
For each (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ denote now by
(
x0,y0
) ∈ RM0+ ×RM′+ the vector
defined by x0k = xk if k ∈M and x0k = 0 if k ∈M0\M and y0k = yk if k ∈M′.
It is well-known that ν (A) = (x,y) if and only if ν
(
A0
)
=
(
x0,y0
)
.
We claim that (x,y) ∈ C(wA) if and only if
(
x0,y0
) ∈ C (wA0) , and also that
(x,y) ∈ C(wA) if and only if (x′,y′) ∈ C (wAµ ) , where the relationship between
their coordinates is x′i = xi− aµi for i ∈M, and y′j = y j for j ∈ µ(M). Notice that
y j = 0 for j ∈M′ \µ(M). This claim is immediate from the previous comments.
Take any (x,y) ∈C(wA) and let /0 6= S ⊆M be an arbitrary coalition. For ease
of notation we denote S′ = µ0(S) = µ(S). We obtain
δA
0
S,S′
(
x0,y0
)
= min
i∈S j∈M′\S′
{
xi,xi+ y j−ai j
}
=
since for j ∈M′ \µ(M) we have y j = 0, and (10)
= min
i∈S j∈µ(M)\S′
{
xi,xi+ y j−ai j,xi−aµi
}
=
since xi ≥ xi−aµi for all i ∈ S,
= min
i∈S j∈µ(M)\S′
{
xi−aµi , [xi−aµi ]+ y j−ai j +aµi
}
=
whenever ai j ≤ aµi we have [xi−aµi ]+ y j−ai j +aµi ≥ [xi−aµi ],
= min
i∈S j∈µ(M)\S′
{
xi−aµi , [xi−aµi ]+ y j−aµi j
}
=
= δA
µ
S,S′
(
x′,y′
)
.
Similarly we obtain
δA
0
S′,S
(
x0,y0
)
= δA
µ
S′,S
(
x′,y′
)
.
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Moreover, for any (x0,y0)∈C(wA0) and any /0 6= S⊆M0 such that S∩(M0\M) 6=
/0, we have
δA
0
S,S′
(
x0,y0
)
= 0,
δA
0
S′,S
(
x0,y0
)
= 0.
Now, by using (7), it is immediate to prove that ν (A) = (x,y), if and only if
ν (Aµ) = (x′,y′).
Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. To prove the ‘if’ part, let A ∈M+m×m′ be a matrix and let (x,y) = ν (A) be
its nucleolus.
Let µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) be an optimal matching. Clearly, non-assigned sellers by
µ get zero payoffs in the nucleolus. Therefore, let Z′0 be the set of non-assigned
sellers by µ, i.e. Z′0 = M′ \µ(M).
Now apply Lemma 3.1 and ν (Aµ) = (x′,y′), with x′i = xi− aµi for i ∈M, and
y′j = y j for j ∈ µ(M) where vector aµ =
(
aµi
)
i∈M and matrix A
µ are defined as in
(10) and (11). Then, applying Theorem 3.2,
min
i∈M
{xi} ≥min
i∈M
{
xi−aµi
}
= min
j∈M′\Z′0
{
y j
}
.
This is condition 2.
To prove the converse implication we define matrix V ∈M+m×m′ by
vi j :=

xi+ y j if i ∈M, and j ∈M′ \Z′0,
xi− min
j∈M′\Z′0
{
y j
}
if i ∈M, and j ∈ Z′0.
(14)
Note that any matching between M and M′\Z′0 is optimal for V, i.e. M (M,M′ \Z′0)⊆
M ∗V (M,M
′) . This matrix V ∈M+m×m′ is, in fact, a valuation matrix. The proof is
left to the reader.
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We must prove now that vector (x,y) is the nucleolus of this matrix V. By
Lemma 3.1, (x,y) = ν (V ) if and only if ν (V µ) = (x′,y′), with x′i = xi− vµi for
i ∈ M, and y′j = y j for j ∈ µ(M), for some µ ∈M (M,M′ \Z′0) . Indeed, all of
them are optimal.
By (10), vµi = xi− minj∈M′\Z′0
{
y j
}
for all i∈M and then x′i = xi−vµi = minj∈M′\Z′0
{
y j
}
for all i ∈M. Therefore matrix V µ satisfies, for all (i, j) ∈M× (M′ \Z′0),
vµi j = max
{
0,y j + min
j∈M′\Z′0
{
y j
}}
= y j + min
j∈M′\Z′0
{
y j
}
= x′i+ y
′
j.
Since min
i∈M
{x′i}= mini∈M
{
min
j∈M′\Z′0
{
y j
}}
= min
j∈M′\Z′0
{
y′j
}
and V µ is a square valuation
matrix, we obtain ν (V µ) = (x′,y′).
Proof of the non-square case in Theorem 4.2
Proof. Clearly the main diagonal is an optimal matching for C. Moreover ν (C) =
(x,y) . Indeed, apply Lemma 3.1 and notice that matrix Cµ is just the minimal
matrix already stated in the square case for the nucleolus (x′,y′) ∈ RM+ ×Rµ(M)+
defined by x′1 = min j∈µ(M){y j},x′i = xi for i = 2, . . . ,m and y′j = y j for j ∈ µ(M).
As a side effect Cµ is minimal inFν(x′,y′).
To see that C is minimal, assume D∈M+m×m′ ,D≤C,D 6=C and (x,y) = ν(wD).
Recall that all optimal matchings for D are also optimal for C. We distinguish two
cases.
(1) x1 = min
j∈µ(M)
{
y j
}
. Notice that d1m+1 = c1m+1 = 0. We are essentially in the
square case and we are done, D =C.
(2) x1 > min
j∈µ(M)
{
y j
}
. In this case we know xi > 0 for all i ∈M. Then, there are two
possibilities:
(2a) An optimal matching for D, µ ′ ∈M ∗D (M,M′) satisfies µ ′(M) = µ(M).
By Lemma 3.1 the vector (x′,y′) ∈RM+ ×Rµ(M)+ defined by x′1 = x1−d1m+1,x′i = xi
for i = 2, . . . ,m and y′j = y j for all j ∈ µ(M) is the nucleolus of matrix Dµ
′
. This
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implies min
i∈M
{x′i}= min
j∈µ ′(M)
{y′j} or x1−d1m+1 = min
j∈µ ′(M)
{y′j}. Similarly x1−c1m+1 =
min
j∈µ(M)
{y′j}, but then d1m+1 = c1m+1. From here it is easy to see that Dµ
′ ≤ Cµ ,
both matrices share the same nucleolus (x′,y′) and Cµ is minimal in Fν(x′,y′).
Therefore Dµ
′
=Cµ .
Now we prove D=C. For i= 2, . . . ,m and j ∈ µ(M) it is obvious that di j = ci j,
since dµ
′
i j = di j and c
µ
i j = ci j. To see d11 = c11, notice that d1µ ′(1) = c1µ ′(1) =
x1+ yµ ′(1) > 0 and this is only possible if µ ′(1) = 1′ by the definition of matrix C.
Now we analyze i= 1, j ∈ {2, . . . ,m} and c1 j 6= 0. In this case we have c1 j > c1m+1,
and then cµ1 j > 0 and since D
µ ′ =Cµ we have dµ
′
1 j = c
µ
1 j > 0. From here we deduce
d1 j−d1m+1 = c1 j− c1m+1 and d1 j = c1 j. The rest of entries are clearly equal.
(2b) All optimal matchings for D satisfy µ ′(M) 6= µ(M).
In this case there must exist an optimal matching µ ′ ∈ M ∗D (M,M′) such that
µ ′(1) = m+ 1 and µ ′(M \ {1}) ⊂ µ(M). This matching µ ′ is also optimal for
matrix C. Then d1m+1 = c1m+1 = x1 + ym+1 = x1, and min j∈µ(M){y j} = 0. Now,
since matching µ is m2-compatible and Condition iii., we get y1 = 0.
As a consequence c11 = c1m+1. We distinguish two cases.
(2b-1) There exists a buyer i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that µ ′(i) = 1′.
Since µ ′ is optimal for C all buyers different from 1 and i are matched equally by
µ ′ and µ and c11+ cii = ci1+ c1m+1. Therefore yi = 0 and by definition c1i = 0.
Now we apply Lemma 3.1 to matrix D. Firstly notice that dµ
′
k = 0 for all
k ∈ M,k 6= i, and dµ ′i = dii. Moreover, mink∈M
{
xk−dµ
′
k
}
= min
j∈µ ′(M)
{
y j
}
= 0, which
implies dii = xi. The nucleolus of Dµ
′
is (x′,y′)∈RM+×Rµ
′(M)
+ with x
′
k = xk for k 6= i
and x′i = 0 and y
′
k = yk for k ∈ µ ′(M). Notice that for all k ∈ µ ′(M),k 6= (m+1)′,
we know dµ
′
1k = max{0,d1k−dµ
′
1 }= d1k.
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Then we get a contradiction:
δD
µ ′
{1},{(m+1)′}(x
′,y′) =min
{
x1, min
1≤k≤m,k 6=i
{x1+ yk−dµ
′
1k}
}
=min
{
x1, min
1≤k≤m,k 6=i
{x1+ yk−d1k}
}
= x1, and
δD
µ ′
{(m+1)′},{1}(x
′,y′) =min
{
ym+1, min
1≤k≤m,k 6=1
{xk + ym+1−dµ
′
k m+1}
}
= 0,
where we have used the fact that x1+yk−d1k ≥ x1+yk−c1k and if xk ≥ yk,c1k = 0
and if xk < yk,c1k = x1+ yk− xk. Also that ym+1 = 0.
The last case to analyze is the following one.
(2b-2) Seller j = 1 is unmatched by µ ′.
Since µ ′ is optimal for C all buyers different from 1 are matched equally by µ ′ and
µ. That is, matching µ ′ = {(1,m+1),(2,2), . . . ,(m,m)} . In this case d11 < c11 =
x1 since we are assuming matching µ is not optimal for D. Now we apply Lemma
3.1 to matrix D. Firstly notice that dµ
′
k = dk1 for all k ∈M, and the nucleolus of Dµ
′
is (x′,y′) ∈ RM+ ×Rµ
′(M)
+ with x
′
k = xk− dk1 for k ∈M and y′k = yk for k ∈ µ ′(M).
Recall that x′1 = x1−d11 > 0.
This implies min
i∈M
{x′i}= min
j∈µ ′(M)
{y′j}= 0. Then there exists a buyer i∈{2, . . . ,m}
such that x′i = xi−di1 = 0. Thus, di1 = xi > 0 and ci1 ≥ di1 > 0. From the definition
of matrix C, we obtain yi = 0 and dii = xi. Therefore di1 = dii and matching
µ ′′ = {(1,m+1),(2,2), . . . ,(i−1, i−1),(i,1),(i+1, i+1), . . . ,(m,m)}
is optimal for D. We are in case (2b-1).
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